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By BERNARD M. DICKENS*
1. Introduction
The discipline of eugenic science is easily discredited by association with
offensive programs of breeding for human superiority, and preventing breeding
by those whose children a society pre-determines would be unacceptable on
racial or class grounds. In the United States, "eugenics" has a status close
to that of a vogue dirty word, like "racism" and "fascism", with which it is
sometimes confused. In 1972, when the American Eugenics Society found
that almost eighty percent of its members wanted the word removed from its
name, the Society voted to call itself the Society for the Study of Social
Biology.1 Whoever can establish a new name for the authentic concern of
eugenics, a science dealing with the improvement of genetic qualities, may
secure for the discipline a new respectability, and for himself a place in
posterity. In Canada in particular, no service was done to the science by the
use of the name "Eugenics Boards" to describe the statutory boards in
Alberta and British Columbia dealing with mental patients feared likely to
transmit to their progeny characteristics harmful to society; the recent demise
of these boards leaves behind a disquieting record of compulsory sterilization
upon highly suspect scientific grounds.
The word "eugenics" (from the classical Greek eugenes, meaning heredi-
tarily endowed with noble qualities) was introduced into the English language
by Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911), an anthropologist and cousin of Charles
Darwin, when he published his book Inquiries into Human Faculty and its
Development in 1883. Accepting empirical evidence of selective organic
breeding compelled by survival of only the fittest, he observed:
We greatly want a brief word to express the science of improving stock, which is
by no means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in
the case of man, takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however remote a
degree to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of
prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had.2
This definition clearly goes beyond issues of individual genetic transmis-
sion, and includes, for instance, economic and environmental factors which
together may be called social as opposed to biological or personal eugenics. It
is usual, however, to regard eugenics as centered upon genetic knowledge.
* Visiting Research Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
For an illustration of modem repulsion against eugenics, and a somewhat paranoid
suspicion of its continuing subversive "subterraneous posture", see M. Fong and L.
D. Johnson, The Eugenics Movement: Some Insight into the Institutionalization of
Racism (1974), 9 Issues in Criminology 89.
2 (2d ed. London: Dent, reprinted 1951) at 17, note 1. He had earlier failed to
successfully launch the word "viriculture".
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Galton's purpose of propelling evolution by speeding up the inevitable
prevalence of the "more suitable" presupposes that they can be identified in
advance of their more successful survival, but, despite the controversy Galton's
proposals have generated since the opening decades of this century, they can
be seen as ethically neutral in themselves. His definition of "eugenics" now
appears unfortunately phrased, however, and at best naive, in the light of our
knowledge of how the evolutionary principle that the fittest do survive was
perverted by Nazi philosophy into the fierce imperative that the fittest (by Nazi
definition) must survive. Modem writers, with curious insensitivity almost con-
firm the apprehensions of critics of eugenics doctrine - they have been no
more aware than was Galton of their liability to offend against racial or class
susceptibilities. For instance, a former General Secretary of the British
Eugenics Society, C. 0. Carter, advocating eugenically desirable policies, has
written that "special efforts are needed to offer the opportunity of family
planning to the most ignorant and least gifted groups." s The hidden cultural
components of ignorance and giftedness have now been identified in tradi-
tional tests of these qualities4 , to the effect that such tests measure nurture
rather than nature, and reward cultural sharing and assimilation with the
testers, penalising test subjects of different culture. Carter's "offer of oppor-
tunity" may thus appear an invitation to voluntary genocide. The purpose of
eugenics may be worthy of more thoughtful presentation as offering relief from
the procreation of seriously impaired or disadvantaged children to parents
and families, rather than to persons as members of racial or social groups.
It would be useful if a clear distinction could be drawn between positive
and negative eugenics, because negative eugenics is more immediately accept-
able as a preventive and curative discipline. It is possibly even attractive in
focusing on the elimination of disease and especially bio-chemical defects
which future individuals would be likely to inherit genetically. In promoting
their well-being, negative eugenics appears to advance the interests of humane
society. Haemophilia and diabetes, for example, are genetically transmitted
defects, found in some children, which may become preventable by the results
of research in genetic engineering. This research may establish a treatment
of potential parents before conception, or of a fetus before birth. At the
moment, such conditions may be treatable by, for instance, placing affected
children upon a special diet devoid of harmful materials such as phenylalanine
or certain natural sugars, but several genetically transmitted diseases not
responsive to antibiotics are eugenically only self-regulating in the sense that
the children they attack are unlikely to survive to the age or condition of
reproduction. Nevertheless, it is a current social dilemma that medical science
and technology increasingly subvert the principle of survival of the fittest, and
frustrate that of natural selection, by prolonging to the point of reproduction
the lives of many who carry deleterious genes. They transmit their genetic
defects to future generations, weakening the genetic capacity of the human
race by increasing its accumulated inheritance of potentially harmful genes. A
3 Human Heredity (revised ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) at 256.
4 For an interesting commentary on the cultural component of the Law School
Admission Test, see Douglas, J. in De Funis v. Odeguard (1974), 94 S. Ct. 1704 at
1708 et seq.
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time may come when individual genetic screening and counselling are con-
sidered essential services to each community, with the policy to be applied
upon identification of potential harm hopefully being based upon consent of
the individuals concerned.
Positive eugenics, named "euphenics" by Joshua Lederberg in an uncon-
scious bid for some traction on posterity5, contains the essence of Galton's
purpose, and faces the awesome task of improving humankind to make its
members more intelligent, talented and physically fit to survive in a changing
atmosphere and material environment. By synthesizing new genes to be intro-
duced into human chromosomes, we may face not only the remote spectre
of breeding a sublime master race served by a parahuman, almost anence-
phalous worker race applying its durable human physique in robot tasks,
but also the prospect of human salvation on this world and beyond. Altera-
tion of body temperature could aid survival in a renewed ice-age, a capacity
to derive nourishment from artificial foodstuffs could ease food shortage,
adaptation to life under water, which covers four-fifths of the world's surface,
might afford respite from population pressure on living space, and retardation
or suspension of ageing would assist journeys of curiosity or necessity to other
planets.
Deciphering the genetic code, and so gaining the ability through the
biological sciences to change the genetic message relayed to future generations,
will be comparable to the breakthrough achieved in the physical sciences in
harnessing nuclear energy; the new knowledge in itself will indeed be just as
neutral, but at the disposal of human beings with a potential to use it wisely
or unwisely. These dimensions of positive eugenics are little related to the
present condition of Canadian law. There is, however, such a close interaction
between normally legal negative eugenics and more formidable positive
eugenics, that an alleged distinction must be treated with care. A simple mani-
pulation of semantics will convert negative eugenics into positive eugenics.
By offering the opportunity to eliminate by genetic dexterity individual charac-
teristics of which we disapprove, we are in fact determining the characteristics
to be passed on to generations to come, projecting into the future the light
of current evaluations. Breeding out low intelligence in individuals by tech-
niques of negative eugenics is really the same as propagating high intelligence
in the community, and is consistent with the aims of positive eugenics.
The difficulty with pursuing - consciously or unconsciously - a blue-
print for humankind's genetic destiny is that the implicit evaluations are not
biologically impelled, but stem from social convenience and cultural aesthetics.
Thus, for example, we react with some repugnance to dwarfism (achondro-
plasia) when not paraded for our diversion in the circus, and feel discomfort
in the presence of Marfan's Syndrome, so that parents would want to spare
their children these conditions, even though a child so affected might achieve
the distinction of Toulouse Lautrec or Abraham Lincoln respectively. To limit
5 As a Nobel Laureate, his claim upon posterity may be stronger than most.
6 A congenital ailment characterised by abnormally elongated fingers and possibly
toes, unusually flexible joints, dislocation of the eyes' crystalline lenses, and perhaps less
obvious cardiac and spinal defects.
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human development to our present conceptions of the ideal, however, may
prove harmful. Our coming capacity to counteract mutations7 by the practice
of negative eugenics may in the long run actually threaten the purpose of
positive eugenics by obstructing progress along the evolutionary path. An
inadequate understanding of human ecology may prevent recognition of those
mutations that indicate a spontaneous biological adaptation to a new environ-
ment, and, far from overcoming what we perceive to be nature's occasional
deviant tricks, we may in ignorance deny ourselves evolution's promise of sur-
vival by change.
This issue is too vast to be considered with-in the compass of this and
perhaps any article on law. The long term prospects of increasingly pyrotechnic
medicobiology, such as entirely ectogenetic fertilization and the asexual pro-
duction of new humans identical to the donor of the single cell from which
each develops by the process of cloning, undoubtedly warrant legal attention,8
but we cannot understand the direction of legal progress in the field of eugenic
recognition without knowing where we are now, and something of where we
have been. There are features of the present legal order which particularly
lend themselves to analysis in eugenic terms, and certain areas of law and the
policies underlying them may be considered as they affect individual and col-
lective procreation and the quality of its product. Control of the birth-rate
pertains more to social than personal eugenics, but the social environmental
inheritance of a child cannot be separated from his genetic inheritance in esti-
mating his prospects of a happy life, and society's prospects of advancement
towards its goals by the addition of his presence.
2. Contraception
Galton and his followers were considerably influenced by the alarming
population predictions of Thomas Malthus. Their great fear was not simply
that the quality of human stock might degenerate, but that humanity itself
might come to exhaust its vital materials and perish by the bulk of its own
numbers: a fear more real in parts of the world today than it appeared in
nineteenth century under-populated fertile North America. Opposition to
7 A striking instance of the spread of a mutation exists in the estimated 8,000 white
and coloured South Africans affected by porphyria variegata due to a dominant gene
derived from a single mutation, all 8,000 having been reliably traced back to a couple
who married in 1688. Porphyria variegata is the failure to metabolize porphyria, a
derivative of a respiratory pigment connected with haemoglobin. This defect causes for-
mation of brown skin patches and sensitivity to barbituates, produces abdominal pains,
neurotic symptoms and can lead to paralysis and death. Porphyria is not always caused
by a defective gene. An outbreak among Turkish children, who suffered resulting liver
damage, came from their eating seeds treated with a fungicide. See G. Dean, The Por-
phyrias (1963), cited by J. A. Fraser Roberts in J. E. Meade and A. S. Parkes, eds.,
Biological Aspects of Social Problems.
8 See, e.g., J.-G. Castel, Legal Implications of Biomedical Science and Technology
in the Twenty-First Century (1973), 51 Can. B. Rev. 119, and H. Krever, Some Legal
Implications of Advances in Human Genetics (1975), 17 Can. J. of Genetics and
Cytology at 137.
[VOL. 13, NO. 2
1 The Law and Eugenics
eugenic advocacy of birth control methods9 was not wanting, however, since
those outraged when Charles Darwin contended that men had sprung from
apes were not mollified when Galton proposed that thenceforward they should
breed like race-horses. The doctrinaire religious convictions of birth-control
opponents were reinforced by the social belief that contraception would lead
directly to free love and moral irresponsibility, endangering the foundations
of stable society built on fidelity to conjugal ties.
Birth-control, reflecting the sexual appetite it was believed to liberate
and corrupt, was not respectable, and not a topic to be discussed in polite
society; as a cause of the publicly-professed godless, indeed, it was to be
opposed by god-fearing folk on account of its patent and latent immorality, if
not its actual obscenity. Like the prostitution to which contraception was held
akin, however, it was not made illegal per se, but attacked through its pro-
curement and advertised availability. Charles Knowlton, a Massachusetts
physician, took up the public cause of contraception, and his book The Fruits
of Philosophy sold over 40,000 copies in England, where public attitudes were
not especially liberal. At home, however, Massachusetts authorities in 1833
suppressed the book, and Knowlton was fined and sentenced to a jail term
of hard labour.10 Organised opposition to the distribution of birth-control in-
formation achieved a breakthrough in 1869 with passage of a New York
obscenity act forbidding dissemination of such information and materials.
Building on this precedent, Anthony Comstock persuaded Congress to enact
section 211 of the 1873 Penal Code prohibiting the transmission of porno-
graphic literature through the mail, and the posting of any device, drug or
printed matter designed to prevent conception among human beings.
So-called "Comstock Laws", modelled on the federal initiative, were
soon enacted in many American state legislatures,1 and the official approach
to the spread of contraceptive information hardened in Britain at the same
time, perhaps to control the emboldened spirits of such as George Drysdale,
who instigated the Malthusian League, and Annie Besant, who became active
in the League's activities. In 1876 the publisher Henry Cook was imprisoned
for selling pornographic books, including The Fruits of Philosophy, to which
he had undertaken to add illustrations, and another publisher of advanced
works, Charles Watts, withdrew the book when pleading guilty to a chaige
under the Obscene Publications Act of 1857. The official attitudes prevailing
in the twin cultures of Britain and the United States, expressed respec-
tively in the Indecent Advertisements Act 1889 and the Comstock Laws,
made it natural that the new Canadian Criminal Code of 189212 would pro-
9 Elizabeth Draper deals with about 165 types and materials of birth-control exclud-
ing sexual abstinence, in Birth Control in the Modern World (2d ed. Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1972) at 435-37.
10 See generally, D. K. Pickens, Eugenics and the Progressives (Nashville: Vander-
bilt U. Press, 1968) at 71.
11 Only in recent years has the United States' Supreme Court declared the remnants
of these laws unconstitutional; see Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479, and
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438.
12 55-56 Vict. c. 29.
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scribe contraceptive advertising. This was achieved in Part XIII, entitled
Offences Against Morality, where section 179 dealt with offences of publishing
obscene matter.
Section 17913 appeared as section 150(2)(c) of the 1953-54 presentation
of the Code, which provided that "every one commits an offence who know-
ingly, without lawful justification or excuse . . . offers to sell, advertises,
publishes, an advertisement of, or has for sale or disposal any means, instruc-
tions, medicine, drug or article intended or represented as a method of pre-
venting conception or causing abortion or miscarriage". 4 The words "without
lawful justification or excuse" related to section 150(3),15 which allowed a
defence of acting within the limits of the public interest. This might have
protected instruction in contraception given to specific persons whose children
would be likely to suffer from genetically transmitted disease or defect, and
so accommodate personal eugenics, but accommodation of social eugenics was
most probably excluded. In R. v. Palmer'" in 1937, the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal upheld an acquittal of an employee of the Parents' Information Bureau pro-
secuted under an earlier version of section 15017 holding that her offer of
contraceptives and explanation of their use to poor married couples with large
families served the public good. Whether the same result would have followed
had the offer and explanation been made to an unmarried woman is, however,
open to doubt. Aiding a couple with more children than they could support to
avoid having another was considered of public advantage, but aiding an un-
married woman to avoid having any may have appeared as complicity in
immorality. The contention of social eugenics that the child born outside a
stable family represents a greater social danger and occasions a higher level
of social expenditure may have been discounted. In R. v. Keystone Enterprises
Ltd.'8 in 1961, a company was convicted under section 150(2) (c) for mailing
circulars advertising contraceptive products indiscriminately to householders,
soliciting orders from those describing themselves simply as adults.
The critical words "preventing conception or" were removed from section
150(2)(c) on January 1, 1970,19 so that advertising contraceptive methods
ceased to be an offence against morality. Beyond that, however, the change
was more nominal than substantial, since legal control was withdrawn from
the Criminal Code in order to be reposed in the federal Food and Drugs Act,
complete with criminal sanctions for breach.20 The Act, administered by the
Department of National Health and Welfare, provides in section 3(3) of its
current form that "Except as authorized by regulation, no person shall adver-
Is Now 159(2) (c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
14 2-3 Eliz. II 1953-54, c. 51.
15 Now section 159(3).
10 (1937), 68 C.C.C. 20.
17 S. 207 of the then Criminal Code following amendments of the 1892 Code in
1906 and 1909.
18 (1961), 133 C.C.C. 338 (Winnipeg Mag. Ct.).
10 By a statute amending the Food and Drugs and the Narcotic Control Acts:
17-18 Eliz. 11 1968-69, c. Al, s. 13.
20 See R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, ss.2 and 26.
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tise to the general public any contraceptive device or any drug manufactured,
sold or represented for use in the prevention of conception". Advertisements
in the nature of information may be sent to physicians, of course, and Post
Office regulations, as an exception to their general prohibition, permit the
mailing of drug samples to physicians and those in analogous positions.21 The
Governor in Council, giving effect to the exception at the opening of section
3(3), has acted under section 25(1) of the Act to authorize numerous regula-
tions,22 and today the system of control of contraception advertisements to
the public appears considerably eased, although it cannot be said that means
and devices are marketable in the same way as are general products, services
or patent medicines.
At the governmental level, the historical Canadian public policy on
contraception, derived from earlier British and United States' approaches, has
been reversed in the present climate of national and international opinion. The
1968 United Nations' Teheran Conference on Human Rights unanimously
approved the basic right of couples to decide the number and spacing of
their children,23 and the following year the General Assembly similarly passed
the resolution that this includes the right of access to the knowledge and
means necessary for exercise of the basic right, 24 which the Economic and
Social Council urged should be put into effect by 1980.25 Both the Canadian
federal and provincial governments provide grants for Family Planning Asso-
ciation services, and since 1970 the former has maintained a training, research
and information program. Consistent with principles of social eugenics and
economic foresight, provincial agencies may meet the cost of certain supplies
to welfare recipients26 and the federal government shares the costs of con-
traceptives supplied through provincial and local governments.
27
The special legal regime that still applies to the supply of contraceptives
and contraception information goes beyond the now expected marketing re-
quirement that advertised performance and efficiency of a product must be
based on adequate testing.28 Provincial laws regulate who may insert intrau-
terine devices, but unfortunately are not always clear as to whether insertion
is "the practice of medicine"; under the law of Ontario, for instance, such.
services cannot be performed by paramedicals. 29 Food and Drug Regulations
21 P.O. Regulations 1970, 1102.3.
22See generally, J. Stepan and E. H. Kellogg, The World's Lmvs on Contraceptives
(Law and Population Monograph Series, No. 17, 1974) at 83 for a survey (though
not very accurate in cited authorities) of the Canadian position.
23 Resolution XVII on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning, adopted May 12,
1968 by vote of 56 to none, 7 abstaining.
24 Resolution 2542 (XXIV), December 11, 1969 by vote of 119 to none, 2
abstaining.
25 Resolution 1672(LI) on Population and Development (1971).
26 See, for instance, Quebec Social Aid Reg. No. 2, sect. 2.01 para. a.
27 See generally, infra, Part 6.
2 8 The Criminal Code, supra, note 13 covers this in ss. 319 and 366 (b) (iii), al-
though recourse to other consumer protection laws may be more apposite.
29 See The Health Disciplines Act, S.O. 1974, c. 47, s. 52 (and s. 67 for penalties).
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govern notification of manufacture and importation of drugs (notably pills)
and certain devices, which must be properly labelled and be available only on
prescription, to protect potential users against taking medically unsuitable
means, drugs or dosages. The risk of untoward side-effects of pills taken even
on prescription is acknowledged, but the 1970 Report of the Special Com-
mittee appointed by the Minister of National Health and Welfare observed
that "it would be irrational to emphasize rare, serious complications and pos-
sible, but largely unproven, dangers to which only a few might be exposed,
and to neglect the enormous and socio-economic benefit which oral contracep-
tives have conferred upon millions of people".3
Commercial advertising remains controlled under the Food and Drugs
Act, but its Regulations are not all-embracing; contraceptive drugs not listed
in Schedule F may be advertised to the general public without infringing the
Act, as may certain devices such as sheaths. The general law on obscenity
applies to such advertisement, of course, and radio and television advertise-
ment is subject to official approval; 31 actual feature programs on birth-control
may be broadcast when appropriate to the medium. 2 Beyond the law, self-
imposed media codes of decency apply, such as the Canadian Code of Adver-
tising Standards. Most codes do not refer to advertising of contraceptive
methods as such, but regulate matters of taste and decency, usually creating a
discretion exercised upon the nature of the proposed advertisement and the
nature of the potential medium. The CBC declines certain categories of adver-
tising not only on grounds of taste but also of controversy, and will not accept
birth-control commercials, nor those for personal hygiene products, but the
CTV claims to be less averse to controversy, and simply applies taste criteria.
Outdoor advertising, particularly on billboards, of family planning products
and comparable items will be controlled not only by content but also by design
of the board and its location. Such advertisements, like cigarette advertise-
ments, will be unlikely to be allowed near a school. Transport authorities, such
as the Toronto Transit Commission, having a relatively captive audience,
many of whom are taxpayers subsidizing the service, will be particularly sensi-
tive not to cause them offence, and will not permit too heavy a message in
such advertising. They may, for instance, bar such words as "contraception"
and "birth-control", and rely on the life-affirming domesticity of "family
planning".
Newspapers will accept advertising of means of contraception, but care-
fully vet and sometimes edit the copy both to eliminate a tasteless presentation
and to cater the message to their general readership group. For instance, the
Toronto Globe and Mail, aiming at the better-educated and higher-income
groups, prefers copy to be informative, with more science than sales-pitch,
80 See RX Bulletin, Food and Drug Directorate (Canada), December 1970 at 1
et seq.
81 The Canadian Radio-Television Commission may make regulations binding on
licencees "respecting the character of advertising": Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. B-11, s. 15(1)(b)(ii).
82 The Broadcasting Policy for Canada requires licencees to provide balanced views
on matters of public concern: see generally, Broadcasting Act, id., s. 3(d).
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while the Toronto Star, having a more general readership, will permit restrain-
ed advertising of prophylactics such as sheaths, but draws the line at those
coming into the "thrill' category and will not sell space to "love boutiques".
The more populist Toronto tabloid, the Sun, however, is more accommodating,
and advertises boutique items from birth-control means to revealing night-
gowns without pondering any contradiction in population policy.
While the legal position on birth-control has changed since the nineteenth
century, and public policy has changed perceptibly in recent decades, the
paradox remains that contraceptive protection is least available to those who
in their own and society's interests most require it, notably the poor and the
young. The supply or fitting of contraceptive means to girls aged under sixteen
years poses special legal problems, aggravated by judicial withholding of
normative rulings in deference to ad hoc ethical determinations arising within
the medical profession. In Re "'D" and the Council of the College of Physicians
and Surgeons of British Columbia MacFarlane, J. held that "Whether
there is impropriety in any particular case is a matter which doctors are better
equipped to adjudicate upon than the Court, and particularly. . . where the
evidence has medical overtones which the medical inquiry committee is more
capable of appreciating than is a Judge".3 4 He declined to disturb the Council's
findings of infamous or unprofessional conduct when a doctor fitted a fifteen
year-old patient with a birth-control device without consent of her parents.
The judge would presumably have been equally content had the doctor been
held not liable. Such a verdict would have been compatible with an English
incident where a practitioner who informed a parent of the prescription of an
oral contraceptive to his fifteen year-old daughter was charged with profes-
sional misconduct in violating the girl's right to privacy in medical treatment.
The doctor was narrowly discharged on the special facts of the case, but it
was made clear by the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council
that future physicians acting in breach of such a patient's confidence would
be liable to face an adverse ruling and its severe consequences.35 A more
pragmatic reason was advanced by the Committee on the Working of the
Abortion Act in Britain, which reported that "A majority of members believe
that in exceptional cases doctors should make contraception available without
the knowledge or consent of the parents where the girl has refused to consent
to their being told, on the ground that in such cases this may be a lesser evil
than allowing the girl to run the risk of pregnancy". 6
Judicial respect for extra-legal rulings of medical governing bodies gives
significance to statements such as. that appearing in January 1971 in the
Report of the Council of" the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario,
that "A physician may treat a person sixteen years of age and over for any
medical condition without the necessity of informing the parents". This con-
Ss (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 570 (S.C.B.C.).
34 Id. at 578.
35 General Medical Council, Disciplinary Committee Minutes, (1971) 108 Minutes
of the G.M.C. at 58-59.
36 Report of the (Lane) Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act, 1974,
para. 245.
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forms to the position enacted into law in, for instance, England,37 and to a
more limited extent in British Columbia.38 but leaves open the position in
principle of a girl aged under sixteen. Regulations for Ontario public hospitals
now require parental consent for non-emergency surgery, diagnostic testing or
medical treatment performed on an under sixteen year old,39 but consideration
of contraceptive treatment would usually arise outside the hospital context.
In Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital40 it was held by the Ontario High Court
that a mature minor could give a legally effective consent to medical treat-
ment,41 this suggesting that a girl of sufficient maturity could validly approve
her contraceptive protection without parental consent. To test whether her
parents could legally resist this, and make their will prevail over their mature
daughter's, one may invert the position to enquire whether they could insist
upon her being fitted with a device despite her resistance. It was doubted in
B. (B.R.) v. B. (J.)42 that a parent could ignore the views of a child of four-
teen or fifteen to compel submission to a blood test, and this may support the
opinion that a girl, who can marry at sixteen and who may well be capable of
maintaining a responsible sexual relationship at fifteen, can legally decide to
undertake, or not to undertake, contraceptive protection. The matter cannot
be pursued beyond such general principles, however, since any litigation would
be determined by its particular facts, especially the relationship between
parents and daughter.
3. Sterilization
Voluntary sterilization is commonly divided into therapeutic, contracep-
tive and eugenic sterilization,43 although any particular operation may be
considered in the light of more than one division.44 Therapeutic sterilization of
husband or wife may arise when conception would endanger the life of the
wife. On analogy with the concept of life in abortion law (see 4 below),
87 Family Law Reform Act 1969, c. 46, s. 8.
8 Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 193, s. 23 (introduced by an Act to Amend the
Infants Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 43, s. 1).
30 R.R.O. 1970, as amended by 0. Reg. 100/74, s. 11, under The Public Hospitals
Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 378.
40 (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 139.
41 At common law, an infant's agreement regarding "necessary physicke" was a
necessary, for which he could lawfully contract; see Lord Coke, Co. Litt. 172 a. See
also, P. D. G. Skegg, Consent to Medical Procedures on Minors (1973), 36 M.L.R. 370.
42 [1968] 466 (C.A.), per Lord Denning M.R. at 473.
43 See B. Starkman, The Control of Life: Unexamined Law and the Life Worth
Living (1973), 11 O.H.L.J. 175. This recent article outlines the path of sterilization
movements in Canada and the United States, and the ground will not be retraced here.
44 A category of involuntary sterilization is that imposed as a penalty. In Skinner
v. Oklahoma (1942), 315 U.S. 789, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, which declined to hold unconstitutional as too arbitrary and a violation
of constitutional equal protection provisions a state law prescribing sterilization for any-
one twice convicted of felony. The Oklahoma Court similarly declined to condemn the
law as providing cruel and unusual punishment. See also J. Paul, The Return of Punitive
Sterilization Proposals (1968), 3 Law and Society Review 77 regarding ten of the United
States' considering imposing the acceptance of sterilization as a condition of eligibility
for support under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) program.
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this may include not simply the fact of life but also its quality, so that the
risk of serious danger to physical or mental health may also be an indication
for therapeutic sterilization. The legal relationship of contraceptive and
eugenic sterilization was discussed in the English case of Bravery v. Bravery4",
in which Denning, L. J. (as Lord Denning then was) cast his often-quoted
and disproportionately influential doubts upon the legality of sterilization on
contraceptive grounds. A majority of the Court of Appeal rejected his con-
clusion on this matter. On the legality of eugenic sterilization, however, he
had no doubts, declaring that "When it is done with the man's consent for a
just cause, it is quite lawful, as, for instance, when it is done to prevent the
transmission of an hereditary disease." 46 The case involved male sterilization,
but the principle applies equally to female sterilization, although some may
distinguish the two in principle upon grounds of reversibility, depending upon
the technique applied.
The Canadian Medical Protective Association's formerly restrictive view,
that sterilization should be performed only to preserve life or health, has
been superseded by its recognition of the uniform legality of voluntary sterili-
zation. The Association "feels the problems should be left for decision by the
individual doctor faced with the patient requesting the operation, to be decided
just as he would decide about any other request for non-essential treatment." 47
In contributing to a patient's feelings of well-being and confidence in inter-
personal relationships, the operation may be comparable in law to cosmetic
surgery. The only legal ground upon which to resist the legality of contracep-
tive sterilization is obscurantist and scarcely worthy of serious regard.
48
Section 228 of the Criminal Code provides that "Every one who, with intent
(a) to wound, maim or disfigure any person ... causes bodily harm in any
way to any person... is guilty of an indictable offence". A maim historically
was an injury to a person rendering him less able to fight in discharge of his
feudal obligations or in his own defence,49 and was a crime more grave than
other assaults in that it was not excused nor mitigated by the victim's con-
sent.50 Castration was a maim5' because it was observed to operate psycho-
logically to impair martial confidence and aggression in defence of self or
others.
There may be a procreational sense in which voluntary vasectomy
is comparable to emasculation, but the psychological effect and social sym-
bolism of the two are quite different, and use of the analogy to show steriliza-
45 [1954] 3 All E.R. 59 (C.A.).
4 61d. at 67.
4
7 Sexual Sterilization for Non-Medical Reasons (1970), 102 C.M.A. Journal at
211.
4 8 Unless, of course, statute prohibits contraceptive sterilization, as it did in the
laws of Connecticut, Kansas and Utah; see J. B. O'Hara and T. H. Sanks, Eugenic
Sterilization (1956-7), 45 Georgetown L. J. 20 at 21, note 13.
49 See R. v. Schultz (1962), 133 C.C.C. 174 (Alta. C. App. Div.).
50 See R. v. Wright (1603), Co. Litt. folio 127 a-b; cf. State of North Carolina v.
Bass (1961), 120 S.E. 2d 580 (N.C. Ct.).
.. .51 See Blackstone Commentaries, (15th ed. London: Strahan, 1809) at 205, and
People v. Kopke (1941), 33 N.E. 2d 216 (S.C. Ill.).
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tion illegal may be rejected without recourse to the further illogicality that
maim did not apply in this feudal sense to females. Easy dismissal of the argu-
ment, however, is not to minimise the struggle of reformers to have the right
to voluntary sterilization legally recognized, 52 but rather is a token of their
success.
Recognition of the legality of voluntary sterilization procedures, whether
performed on therapeutic or eugenic grounds, and later on contraceptive
grounds, has brought its own problems. It is an obvious proposition that forced
consent to the operation is no consent at all, but it has been recorded that
therapeutic abortion committees, and individual physicians in jurisdictions
allowing them lawfully to decide upon termination of pregnancy, have on
occasion made it a pre-condition of approving abortion that the woman con-
sent to sterilization as part of the same procedure.5 3 There may, of course, be
strong medical grounds for advising that a woman should not risk a further
conception, because of the harm likely to result to her not simply from ad-
vanced pregnancy or child-birth, but from experiencing spontaneous abortion
or a late induced therapeutic abortion. Even when there are no specific medi-
cal indications for the operation, however, some United States doctors apply
"the increasingly popular device of penalizing the mother scheduled for a
therapeutic abortion by packaging it as a unit with a procedure for steriliza-
tion".5 4 An economic justification for this device, that may motivate the phy-
sicians concerned, is that after abortion without sterilization the woman is
likely to become pregnant again, because of her ignorance of or refusal to
employ effective contraceptive means. No more wanting the later pregnancy
than the earlier, she will make a further demand upon the scarce resources of
the local health delivery services: a demand the more burdensome when the
woman's own financial means are unable to meet the cost she causes. Never-
theless, an applicant for abortion usually feels in a situation of crisis, and in
any event is in no position to bargain. When presented with the offer of a
package deal, she may therefore be compelled to give a form of consent
to a sterilization procedure of no legal substance. She may find that a subse-
quent award of damages against or judicial penalization of the surgeon or
institution concerned is no compensation, however, for the child she can
no longer have.
It is not necessarily illegal for a therapeutic abortion committee
to decide that a given pregnancy should be terminated only on condition
that the woman agrees to be sterilized at the same time. If the medical indi-
cations are that a woman will be able to have only one more child, and if it
will be considerably more hazardous for her to have it later, an abortion com-
mittee may in these special circumstances inform her of her option to have
another child "now, or never". If she wants another child, it had better be
the one of which she is currently pregnant, and abortion will be denied;, that
52 See C. P. Blacker, Voluntary Sterilization: The Last Sixty Years (1962), 54 The
Eugenics Review 1.
53 See Starkman, supra, note 43 at 177.
54 A. J. Mandy, "Reflections of a Gynecologist", in H. Rosen, ed., Abortion in
America (Boston: Beacons Press, 1967) 284 at 290.
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is, the abortion request will be withdrawn. Any later pregnancy would, of
course, be terminable5 on normal health indications, and necessary steriliza-
tion would be done at that time; or, perhaps preferably, such sterilization
would occur after the birth of the fetus she now bears, to obviate any
later dangerous pregnancy. These are considerations of a purely medical
character. The legal issue is simply that whatever the circumstances, the
woman should know precisely to what she is being asked to consent, and
should be able to reach her decision on sterilization free from an undue
sense of pressure and outside of any appearance of unfair bargaining. In
particular, she should not be offered an abortion-plus-sterilization package
unless the sterilization is indicated upon independent therapeutic or eugenic
grounds; the therapeutic abortion committee's conviction that a woman has
enough children, or that any later pregnancy would be most likely to be ter-
minated upon the woman's request, may not be sufficient justification for link-
ing the procedures together, since the woman may not in fact feel able to
decline the abortion.
The Lane Committee reporting in 1974 on the working of the Abortion
Act 1967 in Britain put the point with force and clarity. It declared
we consider it wrong for a woman to be offered an abortion only on condition
that she consents to be sterilized at the same time. We deplore those cases where
we know that this has happened, even though, from the medical or social point
of view, it may be desirable that she should not become pregnant again. We do
not seek to discourage advice that sterilization is indicated; it is the element of
compulsion which we consider should be eliminated.56
Accordingly, when a therapeutic abortion committee considers abortion
plus sterilization justified, it should simply approve the abortion after
ensuring that the woman has made any "now, or never" decision she had to
reach. The woman may then be approached independently on the advisability
of therapeutic, eugenic or contraceptive sterilization, to be undertaken after
the abortion procedure or during it, but not as a pre-condition to its per-
formance.
The issue of directed sterilization of the allegedly unfit upon eugenic
grounds opens up the experience and the whole agony flowing from the 1928
Sexual Sterilization Act of Alberta 5 and the 1933 British Columbia Act of
the same name.5 8 The enactment of these laws may be understood in the
climate of their time. In Ontario, for instance, the 1930 Report of the Royal
Commission on Public Welfare recommended sterilization laws regarding
immoral defectives and criminals, 59 and in Manitoba a provision in a 1933
55 Although a later therapeutic abortion committee, reading the medical indications
differently, or even responding to a different climate in the society to which it was
sensitive, might consider termination not justified. A particular committee cannot guaran-
tee the decision any later committee will reach.
56 Supra, note 36 at para. 299.
57 S.A. 1928, c. 37.
58 S.B.C. 1933, c. 59.
59 See Starkman, supra, note 43 at 181, note 32: this article deals with the origin
of these laws in Canada and the United States in useful detail.
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bill regarding defectives was deleted only after considerable controversy 0
Such laws, both enacted and proposed, drew notable support from the practice
in the United States, where within the last decade twenty-three states still
had compulsory sterilization laws.61 The constitutionality of asexualization
statutes was upheld by the United States' Supreme Court in the celebrated
1926 case from Virginia of Buck v. Bell.62 This concerned a seventeen year-
old girl with a mental age of nine who had an illegitimate mentally defective
child and whose mother was feeble-minded and institutionalized: Holmes, I.
favoured the sterilization law, observing that "Three generations of imbeciles
are enough".0 3
Eugenic science dates back to the work of Sir Francis Galton, but the
concept of inherited criminality was initiated in the earlier writing of the
Italian psychiatrist, Cesare Lombroso, whose book L'Uomo Delinquente, pub-
lished in 1876, founded the anthropological school in criminology. In refuting
Lombroso's methodology, the English prison doctor Charles Goring neverthe-
less advanced the thesis that deviant tendencies are hereditary, and in particu-
lar assumed in his 1913 publication The English Convict that mental deficiency
was inherited. In this, he paid insufficient attention not only to the incidence
of mental deficiency caused by birth injury and uninherited disease, but also
to that of environmental origin." Goring's conclusions on hereditary deviance
received speedy reinforcement, however, from claims to knowledge arising
from measuring skills based on the newly developed instrument, the Intelli-
gence Quotient, beginning with the appearance in 1914 of the book by K.
Pearson and G. A. Jaederholm, On the Continuity of Mental Defect. The delay
before such ideas found legal expression in the United States and Canada may
reflect not so much scientific caution in acceptance of the bulk of developing
doctrine as the time-lag in law-reform, associated with the political dynamics
of legislative innovation.
The British Columbia Sexual Sterilization Act of 1933 remained un-
changed until its repeal on 18 April 1973,65 and applied to any inmate of an
institution who, " if discharged therefrom without being subjected to an
operation for sexual sterilization, would be likely to beget or bear children
who by reason of inheritance would have a tendency to serious mental disease
or mental deficiency". 6 The 1928 Act of Alberta was successively amended
in the legislature's attempt to keep pace with evolving knowledge of psychiatry.
Go Id. at 183, note 42.
031 See E. Z. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit - Is Sterilization the Answer? (Sym-
posium on Population Control) (1966), 27 Ohio State L. J. 591 at 596; and Fong
and Johnson, supra, note 1.
02 (1926), 274 U.S. 200.
03 Id. at 207. To implement the reasoning of Holmes, J. it might also have been
necessary, of course, to sterilize the child.
04For instance, L. S. Penrose studied 1,000 mentally deficient patients and
found 29 percent affected entirely by hereditary influences, 9 percent affected entirely by
environmental factors, and the remainder by a combination of both factors: The Bio-
logy of Mental Defect (New York: Trunn & Stratton, 1949).
(5 S.B.C. 1973, c. 79.
00 Supra, note 58, s. 4(1).
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The initial Act governed "any inmate of a mental hospital",67 who was to be
examined under the auspices of a Board of Examiners. Then, "If upon such
examination, the board is unanimously of opinion that the patient might
safely be discharged if the danger of procreation with its attendant risk of
multiplication of the evil by transmission of the disability to progeny
were eliminated . ..",8 the board might direct sterilization. The direction
was not compulsory, but required consent of the patient if the Board con-
sidered him fit to give it, or, if not, of his spouse, parent or guardian, and if
none of these existed, of an appointed provincial Minister.6 9 A 1937 Amend-
ment Act distinguished a psychotic person from a mentally defective person,
the latter defined as one suffering from a condition of "arrested or incomplete
development of mind existing before the age of eighteen years, whether
arising from inherent causes or induced by disease or injury".70 A psychotic
person's consent was required as under the 1928 Act, but sterilization of a
mentally defective person became possible without consent.71 A 1942 Amend-
ment Act extended the Board's powers over those affected by neuro-
syphilis, epilepsy with psychosis or mental deterioration and Huntington's
Chorea.72
Although about one hundred persons annually were being sterilized
under this Act in the mid-1960s, 73 it was permeated with biological and
social fallacies, and was more a product of anti-science than of science. Its
application to those whose mental defect arose from injury74 was clearly not
eugenic, and its application to victims of Huntington's Chorea was almost
invariably futile, since this condition usually occurs late in life when the
victim's children have passed their own reproductive period. Reliance upon
I.Q. tests became very doubtful as these tests were shown to have a strong
cultural component, and increasingly reports were publicized such as that
in 1969 when a mentally defective teenage girl, sterilized under the Act with
parental consent, passed her grade 12 examinations.75 In addition, surgery
upon mongoloid children was shown of little purpose, since with their high
mortality rate only about 40 percent reach reproductive age and, without con-
sidering their social opportunities for reproduction, 76 they are in any event
usually sterile. A further fallacy in the legislation existed where it provided
for surgery only with consent, since this cannot be considered to have been
freely given when its refusal would obviously have resulted in the patient
being kept in custody; a custody based, moreover, not upon the patient's
67 Supra, note 57, s. 4.
68 Id. s. 5.
69 Id. s. 6.
70 S.A. 1937, c. 47, s. 2.
71 ld. s. 5.
72 S.A. 1942, c. 48, s. 3.
73 See K. G. McWhirter and J. Weijer, The Alberta Sterilization Act: A Genetic
Critique (1969), 19 University of Toronto L. J. 424.
74 Supra, note 70.
75 McWhirter and Weijer, supra, note 73 at 424.
76 Many mentally incapacitated persons have a low sex drive: see McWhirter and
Weijer, supra, note 73 at 427.
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need of mental treatment nor his personal danger to the community, but upon
his supposed genetic danger.
Increasingly, the view was accepted that, "Socially, the compulsory
aspects of the act bear against persons and families who are likely to be
young, poor, uninfluential, and certainly unlikely to resist personally the inflic-
tion of purportedly legalized mayhem. 77 From its legal, social, and scientific
standpoints the act is a disgrace to the whole of Canada... this ignorant and
perverted legislation poisons the atmosphere and holds up advances in
modem preventive eugenics, which must be based on consent"!.7  Despite
such vigorous and uncompromising condemnation from experts, however, the
repeal of the Acts in British Columbia 9 and Alberta8 0 had to await the
removal of political administrations rather than their enlightenment.
4. Abortion
Canadian abortion law, expressed in section 251 of the Criminal Code,
makes no express accommodation for termination of pregnancy upon a eugenic
indication."' Such an indication may arise from parental genetic predisposition
to breed a defective child, or from disease or injury during pregnancy affect-
ing the child. The former may be illustrated by Down's Syndrome (mongo-
lism) and Tay-Sachs disease,82 the latter by irradiation and rubella (German
measles, this last condition is especially harmful to a fetus if contracted by
the mother during the first trimester of pregnancy, and when in 1964 rubella
reached epidemic proportions in the United States, 3 an estimated 30,000
children were born suffering defects from this cause.84) In contrast to Cana-
dian legislation, the British Abortion Act 19675 provides for termination of
pregnancy if "there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped".8 6
The British Act also recognises social factors, permitting abortion if "the
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant
woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman
or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were
77The anachronism of describing voluntary sterilization as a mayhem (maim)
is not necessarily so in describing an involuntary operation.
7 8 McWhirter and Weijer, supra, note 73 at 430.
79 Supra, note 65.
80 See S.A. 1972, c. 87.
81l Indeed, an amendment to this effect proposed at the time of legislation of thera-
peutic abortion was not accepted: see Krever, supra, note 8.
82 See text, infra, Part 7.
83See C. Tietze, Therapeutic Abortions in the United States (1968), 101 Am. I.
Obst. and Gynec. 784.
84 K. B. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States (1965), 17
Western Res. L. Rev. 403 at 412.
8s5 . 87.
801d. s. l(1)(b). The Lane Committee recorded that in 1971 of 123,084 notified
abortions, 1,277 were on the purely eugenic indication, although such an indication
could have been partly responsible for a further 2.1,282 operations performed on mixed
indications: supra, note 36 at Table C3.
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terminated", 7 allowing that in determining whether such risk exists, "...
account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foresee-
able environment". s8 These words are obviously more immediately accom-
modating than section 251 of the Criminal Code, which permits due certifica-
tion of an abortion only if "the continuation of the pregnancy of such female
person would or would be likely to endanger her life or health".
It follows that if factors of personal eugenics regarding the likely
physical or mental condition of the prospective child, or of social eugenics
regarding the material and emotional environment into which it is likely to be
born, are to be influential, they must operate in law as considerations pertinent
to the pregnant woman's health. A threat to physical health is liable in a
serious case to be a threat to life, but beyond this consideration it is accepted
that the reference to health in section 251 includes mental health.89 If in-
numerable abortions performed under the aegis of section 251 are to be
judged neither illegal nor unethical, it is necessary to identify in health indi-
cations for abortion a modern legal fiction, namely that the components
of a physical or psychiatric indication affect the pregnant woman in ways
from which the law allows her to be protected. This fiction does not imply
impropriety in physicians or psychiatrists who, for example, anticipate harm
to a woman from bearing a child in poor socio-economic conditions; a single
or deserted mother of two young children living on an inadequate diet in a
badly heated upper storey of a building with no elevator, lacking suitable
winter clothing, can properly be described as at risk of ill-health if she has to
bear a further pregnancy to full term. Similarly, the young daughter of a
comfortable family, brought up in a strict and sheltered atmosphere, who will
apparently be thrown out of her home and rejected by her parents upon their
learning of her pregnancy may be considered at risk to her mental health if
not her physical health by its continuation.90 The element of legal fiction con-
sists in the acceptance that the circumstances moving committees conscien-
tiously to certify operations are those the legislature gave section 251 its
present form in order to meet.91
Regarding the child's likely inheritance of physical or mental abnormality,
therefore, the key to legal termination of pregnancy will be the fear of those
attending the mother that her awareness of this likelihood would or would be
likely to cause her distress endangering health. Since the law focuses on the
condition of the mother and not that of the prospective child, there need
not be "substantial risk" of the prospective child being "seriously handi-
87id. s. I(1) (a). A curious feature of this test is that, as mortality and morbidity
rates for medical termination of pregnancy fall below those of childbirth, it may become
necessary to justify not abortion, but birth.
88 Id. s. 1(2).
89 See R. v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
90 See the limited early study of s. 251 by K. D. Smith and H. S. Wineberg, A
Survey of Therapeutic Abortion Committees (1969-70), 12 Crim. L.Q. 279 at 299.
91 Failure to enact an express eugenic indication does not show that eugenic factors
are excluded from contributing to a psychiatric indication, of course. Evidence from
Hansard that Parliament rejected eugenic grounds (supra, note 81) would be inadmis-
sible in a court of law.
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capped", as required by the eugenic indication of British law; section 251 is
satisfied provided that the mother's knowledge of any risk of imperfection
"would or would be likely to endanger her... (mental) health". The technique
of amniocentesis, the surgical ertraction and the analysis of the amniotic
fluid surrounding the fetus, is able to detect genetically transmitted defects
which, if not treatable by fetal surgery or otherwise, may become relevant to
the question of abortion, although use of the technique is by no means
widespread at present.92 Since it may be harmful for a doctor to give a patient
information of his treatment or prognosis that will cause her distress, 93 there
is no need to go through the cruelty of supplying the woman with such an
amount of morbid information as will make her sufficiently anxious to justify
abortion upon grounds of existing mental illness. Section 251 does not require
this, and provided the woman gives normally informed consent to the opera-
tion, it will be lawful if certified to protect the woman against prospective
mental harm.94
A comparable indication of a threat to mental health may arise when
the child's anticipated social and emotional environment would be inimical to
its well-being, or the pregnancy is for some reason deeply repugnant to the
woman. If this reasoning appears to run close to the argument that a woman's
request for abortion can itself play a large part in a psychiatric indication
that she requires one, subject to medical contra-indications, it may be no
more than a rationalization of existing power among those who have the
authority to operate the law; an "opinion" under section 251(4) (c) is no less
genuine because others do not share it, nor even because they would interpret
the purpose of section 251 more restrictively.
The heritage of a child conceived in the rape of its mother, for instance,
may arouse the greatest foreboding, and make it socially preferable that the
pregnancy be terminated. The mother herself may regard nine months of in-
creasingly enervating pregnancy as a continuing offence against her body and
autonomy, and see in the child a living symbol of his father's felony. While
rape is not a ground for abortion under section 251, it may be hard to believe
the legislature of a society concerned to relieve innocent suffering intended to
exclude the bearer of such a pregnancy from lawful termination, even though
the pregnancy might be routine in representing no special health danger, and
the woman's sense of outrage might not threaten her mental balance. The
difficulty with the rape indication for abortion, making legislatures reluctant
to deal with it, is that it treats medical procedures upon an apparently legal
indication. Termination of pregnancy cannot await corroboration of the crime,
such as the offender's conviction or reliable identification, however, nor even
legally probative evidence. In common with abortion upon a eugenic indica-
92 See further text, infra, Part 7.
03 Providing harmful information may even constitute malpractice: see Male v.
Hopmans, [1967] 2 O.R. 457 at 465 (Oat. C.A.), and Natanson v. Kline (1960), 350 P.
2d 1093 at 1103 (Kan.).
94Smith and Wineberg noted in their survey that "All the doctors admitted that
even if the mother were utterly oblivious of the dangers of German measles they would
abort", supra, note 90 at 298, note 12.
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tion, a psychiatrist's genuine conviction that a woman faces impending mental
danger because of her belief as to the circumstances of her pregnancy must
suffice; it may be contended that authority to certify termination of pregnancy
on the ground of rape is equally subsumed by the psychiatric indication. If the
woman wilfully deceives the psychiatrist, of course, the abortion will have an
ambivalent legal character, being lawful vis-a-vis those medically and psy-
chiatrically involved, but illegal concerning the woman who successfully feigns
the conviction dangerous to her mental health that she has been raped, thereby
using the therapeutic abortion committee as a means to procure her own mis-
carriage, contrary to section 251(2) of the Criminal Code.
The contention that a pregnancy arising criminally can ipso facto justify
termination is clearly not made out. A girl aged under sixteen years, with
whom sexual intercourse is an offence against section 146,9r may have the
physical and mental resilience to bear a child, and many do; the younger the
girl, the easier certification of abortion becomes, however, and a refusal to
abort may be because "... these girls are so scared they hide the pregnancy
until it becomes apparent, at which time it's medically unsafe to abort". 6 A
cruel irony is that, while intercourse with a known mental defective is an
offence against section 148, and her child may be a threat to eugenic principles,
her mental health may not be endangered "by continuation of the pregnancy"
since she may not suffer any accelerated deterioration by this experience. An
additional offence that does not seem in itself to justify abortion is incest, and
this so obviously has eugenic aspects that the general position merits separate
consideration (below). It may be added in conclusion, however, that incest
highlights a frequent objection to abortion for willing participants in the
behaviour resulting in pregnancy, namely that the female should not be
allowed to "profit from her own wrong". Apart from misrepresenting abortion
as a right of the worthy rather than the needy, this is objectionable as intro-
ducing the unsavoury concept of punishment by childbirth, and a pitiful social
inheritance of safeguards to the child born of its mother's "wrong".
5. Incest and Prohibited Degrees
Abhorrence of incest runs deep in our conventional culture and sense of
natural order, and may have been at the origin of regulated society itself; in
his widely ranging survey of the organisation and laws of peoples in an early
condition of society, A. S. Diamond observed that ".... in the rules of mar-
riage, or at least the rules prescribing with whom it may or may not take
place, we have reached a vague beginning of law".97 Evidence of the degenera-
tive effects of inbreeding exists in biblical rules98 and narratives, 99 and in
95 Intercourse with a girl aged sixteen but under eighteen may be an offence under
the conditions specified in s. 151, as may seduction of a female aged under twenty-one
years under ss. 152 and 153(1)(b), or indeed of any age under ss. 153(1) and 154.
96 Smith and Wineberg, supra, note 90 at 298.
97 The Evolution of Law and Order (London: Watts, 1951).
98 Leviticus, xviii and xx.
99 See the Book of Enoch, recording Noah's birth as an albino, and the Book of
Jubilee recording that his parents were first cousins.
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modern scientific texts explaining the coincidence of recessive genes. 100 Ad-
vancing knowledge of hereditary transmission of physical and mental defects
does much to explain pre-scientific societies' pragmatic hostility to incestuous
union and belief in the peculiarly high incidence of deformity and disability
among its progeny. Incest may occur, of course, in the institutionalized form
of marriage, or in the episodic form of casual sexual relations; we acknow-
ledge the distinction between the prospective social union of incestuous wed-
lock and the biological union of incestuous mating by treating the former in
our marriage or family law and the later under the Criminal Code. The two
sets of rules do not necessarily coincide, the Criminal Code understandably
being more strict; accordingly, an uncle-niece and aunt-nephew relationship
could not result in marriage,10' but equally would not result in prosecution.10 2
It might be expected that if the historic understanding of the eugenic
harm of inbreeding was decisive, there would be a common practice among
different cultures, founded on a common biological experience. The variety of
ways in which these laws have been drawn from time to time and place to
place, however,103 confounds any pragmatic wisdom. The fact that the legal
definition of prohibited degrees has varied between different cultures and
classes suggests that the incest taboo is invoked to serve other than eugenic
purposes: indeed, when other interests are paramount, the stigma of incest
is disfunctional and may be removed in favour of the seal of social approval,
or at least acceptance. Within historic regal and caste groups, for instance,
endogamous marriage (that is, within close blood ties) was not only allowed
but was mandatory, notwithstanding that the protection of such groups against
degeneration might be supposed to have been a matter of priority. Kings
could not marry commoners, nor could the priestly class marry beneath their
holy status. Traditions disfavouring close marriages could be subjected to
stronger compulsions of exclusiveness of ruling elites, perhaps associated with
claims of divine right if not of divinity itself. Queen Cleopatra is reputed to
have been the product of some twenty-six successive marriages between
brothers and sisters.'04
An economic function of incestuous marriage within a propertied group
or caste would be to ensure that wealth was not dissipated by succession upon
death; marriage with-in a few families preserving tightly interwoven blood ties
would both concentrate the accumulation of possessions and enhance dynastic
ambitions. An alternative motivation for marriage within close degrees of
100 See M. W. Susser and W. Watson, Sociology in Medicine (London, New York:
Oxford U. Press, 1971) at 296 and references at 325.
0 1 For Ontario, for instance, see The Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 261, Form 10,
indicating the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. See also federal Bill C-1001, passed
July 17, 1975: "An Act to provide an exception from the general law" permitting the
marriage of a specifically named uncle and niece.
102 See the Criminal Code, supra, note 13, s. 150.
10 3 The recent application of canon law regarding consanguinity and dispensations
is recorded by H. A. Kelly, Kinship, Incest, and the Dictates of Law (1969), 14 Am. J.
of Jurisprudence 69 at 69-78.
104 Susser and Watson, supra, note 100 at 196.
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blood,105 however, might be the necessity created by the exclusiveness of
rejection. A group of social pariahs would be denied the opportunity of
exogamous marriage, and its members would have to find partners within
the group contained inside the territorial or conceptual confines of the ghetto.
In Jewish law, for instance, first cousins may marry, 00 as may uncle and
niece.' 07 Such unions are often inconsistently recognized even in proximate
legal systems, 08 confirming the ambivalence in social policy directed to
degrees of incest. The advent of efficient contraception, more easily available
sterilization and more liberal abortion, greatly reducing the risk of genetically
defective children resulting from incestuous unions, may add to their uncertain
status in a society increasingly tolerant of formerly unacceptable sexual rela-
tions. If the incest prohibition protected purely eugenic interests, endogamous
intercourse after, for instance, hysterectomy would not be illegal. Since it
clearly is, the inference must be that the modem basis of this law is not
eugenic, but social. Viewed in this light, however, the utility of and consistent
purposes served by the Criminal Code relevant to this area must be open to
criticism, both for failing adequately to cover what is harmful to individuals
specially at risk of sexual exploitation, and for being severe regarding conduct
deserving no punishment at all.
An apparent anomaly arises from the attempt to protect the female
participant lacking autonomy when entering into an incestuous relationship.
Rape is committed, by section 143 of the Code, when the male acts without
the female's consent or "with her consent if the consent . . . is extorted by
threats or fear of bodily harm". Section 150(1) enacts that "Every one commits
incest who, knowing that another person is by blood relationship his or her
parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent or grandchild, as the case may be,
has sexual intercourse with that person", but section 150(3) provides that a
convicted female need not be punished when the court is satisfied that she
committed the offence only because "she was under restraint, duress or fear of
the person with whom she had the sexual intercourse". Rape is punishable with
life imprisonment, and requires the clearest proof of guilt; the "restraint" or
"fear" under section 150(3) may be less than the "threats or fear of bodily
harm" under section 143, facilitating a prosecution for incest where a rape
charge might fail. Nevertheless, the female jointly prosecuted for incest may
105 The frequent reference to "blood" in this context reflects the primitive belief
that the vehicle of biological transmission is blood.
106 Legal ambivalence to first cousin marriages was highlighted in Sottomayor v.
De Barros (1877) L. R. 3 P. D. 1 (C.A.) where cousins married in England (where
the marriage was lawful) when they were domociled in Portgual (where it was unlawful
unless they obtained a papal dispensation). The view that "It is hardly possible to
suppose that the law of England, or of any Christian country, would consider as valid
a marriage which the general consent of Christendom declared to be incestuous" (per
Cotton, L. J. at 5-6), implied more "general consent" than existed.
107 See P. Elman, ed., An Introduction to Jewish Law (The Popular Jewish Library
Series, London: Lincon-Prager (Pubs.) Ltd., 1958) at 32.
10 8 See In re May's Estate (1953), 305 N.Y. 486 (N.Y.C.A.) where a Jewish uncle-
niece marriage was lawfully contracted in Rhode Island when it would have been void
in New York where the parties were domiciled and returned to live; discussed in P. D.
Maddaugh, Validity of Marriage and the Conflict of Laws: A Critique of the Present
Anglo-American Position (1973), 23 University of Toronto L. J. 117 at 132-33.
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undergo a trial experience that is humiliating and traumatic, which may sub-
vert the leniency which section 150(3) intends when her conduct warrants
no punishment. Prosecutors may feel unable to charge one participant in
incest, however, calling the other simply as a witness, and similarly a jury
satisfied that incest occurred may balk at convicting only one party.
By section 150 (4), "brother" and "sister" includes half-brother and half-
sister respectively, so that intercourse with them constitutes incest, punish-
able with up to fourteen years' imprisonment; adopted children, however, not
being in a "blood relationship" under section 150(1), rank as strangers to the
family.109 Section 153(1) provides that a male having illicit intercourse with
his step-daughter, foster daughter or female ward is liable to imprisonment
for two years, but she has no special protection against family members other
than the father, notwithstanding the fact that the emotional and social damage
she suffers from being manoeuvred into a sexual relationship may be as great
as that suffered by a natural daughter, sister or grand-daughter. She may feel
no less a member of the social family, yet be less entitled to protection against
sexual abuse and exploitation. The same applies, of course, to an adopted
child, and to permit socially harmful intercourse with such child by the new
"parent" or any other member of the immediate family, when "she was under
restraint, duress or fear" such as would exempt a female blood relative from
punishment for incest under section 150(3), on the ground that it is genetically
safe, is cynical and unconscionable.
Incest law may also deprive a male participant of the protection he enjoys
under the general law. By section 146(2), his intercourse with a girl between
14 and 16 is an offence, but by section 146(3) he is entitled to acquittal if "the
evidence does not show that, as between the accused and the female person,
the accused is more to blame than the female person". The immature older
brother, misled by his precocious sister, loses this defence, however, when
charged with incest; he may try to mitigate sentence on this ground, at some
risk to the remaining quality of family life, but cannot avoid the stigma of
recorded conviction and its effect upon his subsequent life.
A further inadequacy of incest law reflects its early eugenic origins in
that it focuses upon sexual intercourse. The Criminal Code provides no
special offence or additional penalty when a girl is exploited by indecent
assault where she might expect to be most protected, namely within her own
family; moreover, her consent, however indicative this may be of seriously
defective if not actually depraved upbringing, removes the conduct entirely
from the Criminal Code. Equally, regarding both males and females, buggery
100 Part VI of the Code, concerning offences against the person, provides in section
196 that "child" includes an adopted child, but Part IV on sexual offences and public
morals has no such definition. Under most provincial laws, such as the Ontario Child
Welfare Act (R.S.O. 1970, c. 64), although "For all purposes . . . the adopted child
becomes the child of the adopting parent.. .as if the adopted child had been born in
lawful wedlock to the adopting parent" (s. 83(1) (a)), this does "not apply for the pur-
poses of the laws relating to incest and the prohibited degrees of marriage" (s. 83(4)).
Whether provincial legislation can affect the capacity of the adopted child to marry any
member of his new family whom he could have married had the adoption not occurred
is arguable (see Re Murray Canal-Lawson v. Powers (1884), 6 O.R. 685 (Ch.)). Capa-
city to marry is a federal concern.
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contrary to section 155 and gross indecency contrary to section 157 are ex-
cepted from liability as such if, under section 158, they are committed "in
private between... any two persons, each of whom is twenty-one years or
more of age, both of whom consent to the commission of the act", notwith-
standing that the two persons fall within the degrees specified in section 150
or are otherwise close blood relatives, including members of the same sex.
Considering what the Criminal Code allows, it appears hard to rationalize
all of the special prohibitions of the incest law, and considering what these
prohibitions attempt to prevent under sanction of heavy punishment, it appears
no easier to justify all that the Criminal Code allows. The picture is incom-
plete, of course, without reference to provincial child welfare legislation,
which might punish parental sexual conduct toward a child within the age of
child welfare protection not punished by the Criminal Code, whether because
of the child's consent or otherwise. The same legislation might also punish
such parental neglect as allows comparable conduct by a sibling, grandparent,
or indeed any other person placing the child in moral danger. Nevertheless,
provincial child welfare laws would be subjected to a weight they were not
designed to bear" 0 if used to extend the incest prohibition to analogous con-
duct not punishable under the Code, and while there is no evidence of an
urgent need, there is a case for rationalizing the federal law. The range of per-
mitted sexual relations of persons within the same family, defined by both
blood and affinity, to include adopted, step and foster children, should con-
form to clear rules of social origin, designed to protect the emotional and
social interests of those vulnerable to harm. The law should not distinguish
sexual intercourse from other sexual conduct equally harmful to development,
even of those who give a degree of consent that would decriminalize the con-
duct of a partner not expected to exercise the special restraints compatible
with domestic discipline.
If, however, no question of exploitation arises, and a mature brother
and sister of the half-blood or the full-blood wish to live together in simula-
tion of man and wife, it is unnecessarily oppressive of their freedom, and in
service to no social interest, to leave them liable to imprisonment for up to
fourteen years. Those couples whose liability to produce genetically defective
offspring is as strongly prognosticated as that of siblings are free to reject
genetic counselling and procreate, in or out of marriage, and a brother and
sister wishing to find happiness in a stable union should be afforded the legal
right to try; to express the issue in its most distasteful way, if they may live
together in lawful buggery, they should be free to live together in a more
generally orthodox sexual relationship. Incest law regarding non-exploitive
casual sexual relations between siblings could similarly be discarded with little
social risk, since such incidents are rarely prosecuted now, and their identifica-
tion among those aged under the limits of provincial child welfare laws are
treated in the context of the social disorder and need for care such conduct
may betoken. Punishments of the criminal law have little to offer in this
context; there is a strong sense in which both volunteers in such relations are
victims.
110 The Ontario Child Welfare Act, id., for instance, is administered by the pro-
vincial Ministry of Community and Social Services.
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6. Public and Welfare Law
Public law, for instance that concerning social welfare,' is in principle
eugenically neutral, but it has features bearing upon considerations of social
eugenics. The federal Family Allowance Act of 1944,112 for instance, pro-
vides non-means-tested allowances, paid monthly to their mothers, for all
Canadian children, to supplement the income of families with dependent
children aged under eighteen. These allowances rank as income of the person
claiming exemption for the child for income tax purposes or otherwise of the
person receiving them, the amount determined by arrangements between the
federal and relevant provincial governments. Application forms for allowances
are available at any post office but also at maternity hospitals, confirming that
from birth an eligible child will be a source of income to the maintaining
parents. Beyond federal allowances lie provincial means-based payments,
such as under The Ontario Family Benefits Act," 3 providing for a person
unable for various reasons financially to support him or herself and a de-
pendent family. Geared to estimated domestic budgetary needs, the allowance
is paid to a mother raising a dependent child or children alone, a disabled
parent and, for instance, one permanently unemployed. In addition, free
health benefits may be provided through the Ontario Health Insurance Plan,
and dental care is available to benefit a recipient with a dependent child, the
cost of drugs prescribed by doctor or dentist also being covered. Alter-
natively, municipal governments may absorb these costs under The General
Welfare Assistance Act,11 4 which may include financial allowances to heads
of families in need.
These allowances in themselves are not so lavish as to constitute an
inducement to breed children, but they symbolise a public attitude of tolerance
to family size unrelated to individual family means. For the sake of children
of poor families, it should not be otherwise. Nevertheless, under this system
those with least to offer children, in material terms and very often in educa-
tional, cultural and environmental terms, are given greatest support to redress
their deprivation, and little disincentive to family expansion; the position may
indeed be self-perpetuating, since their children may well fail to escape the
poverty trap and, being educationally disadvantaged and so low earners
when employed, they are liable themselves to procreate children equally de-
pendent upon public support. Recommendations such as have appeared in the
United States that those dependent upon public financial relief limit their
family size,"' however, smack of class discrimination, and worse when the
dependent class is of specific ethnic identity. Paradoxically, among some
Canadian ethnic immigrant groups, a stronger propellant to family limitation
may exist in provisions for the elderly.
111 For federal and Ontario provisions in outline, see B. Touzel, The Province of
Ontario, Its Social Services (8th ed. Toronto: Ontario Welfare Council, 1974).
1 2 See now, R. S. C. 1970, c. F-1.
113R.S.O. 1970, c. 157.
'1 R.S.O. 1970, . 192.
11" See Paul, supra, note 44.
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In many cultures the tradition of having large families has been not so
much an indulgence or vaunting of virility as a prudent means of ensuring
economic security. In both agricultural and industrial societies with no gover-
mental provision for old age, the elderly depend for sustenance directly upon
the products of their children's labour. The necessity of having sufficient
children to provide for one's aged incapacity is reinforced by high rates of
infant mortality; in male-dominated cultures, furthermore, where daughters
are economically less productive and in any event leave home upon marriage,
the birth of a son, and his survival, are essential insurance of continuing food
and shelter. The first son used to take priority over older daughters, and in
many legal systems was compensated for the imposed burden of family leader-
ship, and at the same time tied to the family settlement, by the rule of primo-
geniture. This pragmatic accommodation to the necessity of family reliance,
which in devout communities may have found expression not only in rejoicing
at the birth of a son as a special blessing but also in religious doctrines hostile
to deliberate birth limitation, serves no material need in modem Canada.
Here, the socialised welfare system applies, principally based on the
federal collection of taxes from income-earners and disbursement among
the elderly, with needs-based increments in money, goods and services from
provincial and municipal governments. The federal Old Age Security Act" 6
pays monthly sums to qualified residents sixty-five years of age, without the
recipient necessarily having previously paid taxes, and whether or not the
recipient is drawing a salary or other income; those dependent solely on the
Old Age Security pension may also be eligible to receive a Guaranteed Income
Supplement." 7 Through the Canada Assistance Plan, the federal government
shares costs incurred by provincial and municipal governments in anticipating
and meeting the needs of all persons, irrespective of age, covering the whole
spectrum of welfare assistance and including training in self-reliance. In
Ontario, the Senior Citizens' Bureau of the Ministry of Community and Social
Services administers legislation pertaining to various programs for the elderly,
including running homes for those over sixty years of age needing supportive
services, and contributing to costs of maintaining residents in municipal
institutions.
The theme of institutional treatment and hospitalization raises two fur-
ther aspects of eugenics in public and welfare law. The first has already been
noted (see Introduction), namely that improved standards of medical care
allow the genetically less fit to survive and to procreate children whose own
genetic endowment and potential are socially disfunctional. The social cost
of seeking and of achieving the propagation of the unfit will become an in-
creasingly sizable component of the terrible calculus of economic health care
and effort to preserve individual life. The second concerns more personal
aspects of eugenics, since the hospitalized physically and mentally afflicted
are frustrated in such sexual urges as they may experience by the administra-
110 R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-6.
"7 Citizens qualifying to participate gain additional protection from the Canada
Pension Plan, except that those in Quebec participate in its own comparable plan.
1975]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
tive obstacles to conjugal visiting;"18 the contribution their lack of opportunity
to conceive children makes to negative eugenics depends, of course, upon the
genetic transmissibility of their disorder. Without regard to the possibility of
a patient's physical or psychological condition being improved by such visits,
the public hospital system secures this eugenic result as an unintended by-
product of its pursuit of administrative convenience. The developing patients'
rights movement, currently gaining momentum in the United States,119 may
in time make itself felt in Canada in this area. In the absence of such recog-
nized rights, the entitlements of both patient and spouse depend less upon
provisions of the law than upon the ability to purchase private medical treat-
ment in suitable accommodation. 120
With the discrediting of theories of inherited criminality' 21 there can be
less cause on eugenic grounds for prohibiting conjugal visits to the penally
incarcerated. Reasons of convenience, accommodation and delicacy are offi-
cially advanced to resist this proposal, as well as the difficulty in principle and
administration of, for instance, distinguishing between the visiting rights of
lawful wives, common law wives, cohabiting women, irregular but frequent
sexual partners, casual friends and those paid or provided by outside associates
upon an ad hoc basis. It may be considered, however, that at least a lawful
wife's claim to bear her husband's child is worthy of recognition, perhaps
as much so as the convenience of prison administrators, especially with the
growing recognition that nothing should be done to or withheld from a prisoner
not strictly required in the interests of his rehabilitation or detention for the
public protection. 122 This is not the place to consider the positive impact the
prospect of returning to a family life may have upon the prisoner's discipline
and rehabilitation, nor the negative point that prison life today is forced ad-
ministratively to accommodate several forms of sexual activity,123 , to the
exclusion of that socially deemed normal. It may be observed, however, that
when a wife cannot visit a prison for conjugal purposes, and her husband
cannot be temporarily released, techniques of artificial insemination are
available to facilitate conception without sexual relations or close personal
118 See D. E. Hagerty, L. A. Kane, Jr. and D. K. Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights
of the Mentally Retarded (1972), 6 Farn. L. Q. 59; B. Green and R. Paul, Parenthood
and the Mentally Retarded (1974), 24 University of Toronto L. J. 117; and B. N.
Schoenfeld, Human Rights for the Mentally Retarded: Their Recognition by the Pro-
viders of Service (1974), 4 Human Rights 31 at 57.
119 See G. I. Annas, The Hospital: A Human Rights Wasteland (1974), The Civil
Liberties Review 9.
120 At present, public hospitals allow overnight visiting only for children's parents.
121 See generally, N. Walker, Crime and Punishment in Britain (2d. ed. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh U.P., 1968) at 45-51.
1
22 In State ex rel. Thomas v. State of Wisconsin (1972), 198 N.W. 2d 675, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court proposed that a prisoner retains constitutional right "... un-
less the government can show the restrictions are related both reasonably and neces-
sarily to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment, such as rehabili-
tation or the security of the prisoner and prison. Mere convenience of the prison admini-
stration is not sufficient" (per Hallows, C. J. at 682). This principle was applied to
writing letters, but it seems capable of extension.
123 Frequently in processes to screen homosexuals and keep them apart from those
they may infect.
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proximity. The technique has been used officially in the United States armed
forces of sending back from Viet Nam the frozen sperm of soldiers to im-
pregnate their wives at home. This facet of the New Biology has a consider-
able potential in society, and in conclusion, eugenic aspects of such develop-
ments may be considered in outline.
7. The New Biology
It cannot be pretended that Canadian law has made more progress than
any other contemporary legal system in facing, to say nothing of actually
accommodating, eugenic and other implications of evolving biological skills.
Artificial insemination by a husband is among the less controversial of these,
however, and probably the most easily accommodated under the present law.
The eugenic problem the practice raises centres on the cause of the husband's
inability himself to inseminate his wife. If he is impotent, for organic or psy-
chogenic reasons, or sub-fertile, the condition of body or mind may be capable
of hereditary transmission, to the prejudice of his male child, grand-child,
or other successor under the laws of genetic inheritance. Artificially aided
genetic survival through their offspring of those who objectively are not the
fittest so to survive raises the constantly recurring question of the disfunctional
eugenic effects of modem and prospective biology.
Artificial insemination by donor, claimed already to have accounted for
the births of up to a million children in the United States,' 24 raises an array
of legal questions, including control of the genetic calibre of the donor.
Modem law fails to deal with this, outside of inadequate provisions on negli-
gence, contract and consumer protection. Obstetricians and family physicians
operating in this field now undertake to obtain semen from healthy donors
they attempt to match to the husband in appearance and blood group, and
frequently dedicate the potential mother to the cause of positive eugenics
by selecting a donor more intelligent than her husband, but in time, as resort
to A.I.D. grows, they may turn to commercial suppliers. The few commercial
sperm banks today are based primarily on vasectomy and infertility insurance
and safeguarding family rights of men in occupations with high risk of
sterility or mutation, but they might in the future purchase reserves of
variously characterised sperm, for sale to physicians or indeed members of
the public such as nurses, unqualified fringe practitioners and women seeking
a do-it-yourself facility.125 The proven risk of hepatitis infection through
inadequate screening of blood donors' 26 adumbrates the consequences of
inadequate genetic testing on semen donors, whether by individual practi-
tioners or commercial suppliers. The female equivalents of semen donation,
12 A See L. Pauling, Reflections on the New Biology (1968), 15 U.C.L.A. Law Rev.
267 at 271; this is the most extreme estimate cited, but most exceed 100,000.
125 The potential public function of such biotechnical commercial enterprises is
considered briefly in M. H. Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in Distributive Justice
and Utility Posed by the New Biology. (1974), 48 Southern Calif. L. Rev. 318 at
366-68.
126See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital (1970), 266 N. E. 2d 897
(111. S.C.), and generally, R. M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship From Human Blood
to Social Policy (New York: Pantheon, 1971).
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namely ovum donation and embryo transfer,127 raise the same issues mutatis
mutandis, and they attach in conjunction to fertilization of an ovum in vitro.
The confidentiality protecting the identity of the semen, embryo and
ovum donor may itself pose a eugenic threat. A donor may be used for
many separate fertilizations, and so long as artificial insemination remains un-
regulated by a central notification requirement and operates as part of the
free enterprise system, there are few means of limiting the possibility of a male
and female offspring of the same donor later meeting and marrying, in a
manner biologically though not legally incestuous. 128 The prospect is very
real, since A.I.D. practitioners operate within a particular neighbourhood,
district or region and, as they offer luxury medicine, within a particular socio-
economic class. 129 There is therefore a higher than average prospect of children
of the same donor meeting in circumstances conditioned to their marriage,
they being not only socially compatible but also compatible in personality,
finding (though not to the full extent) that they have things in common.1
30
The risks this prospect raises may be socially acceptable, especially since
donors are screened on health grounds to eliminate those with transferable
genetic defects, but in any event they could be reduced, while preserving the
privacy of the circumstances of individual conception, by a system of genetic
screening at birth,13' or later as part of counselling before marriage.182
At present, the prospect of introducing compulsory screening, and pro-
hibition of marriage without sterilization where significant risk exists of pro-
ducing defective offspring, seems altogether too draconian to contemplate,
not least since such measures could not prevent casual conceptions by the
genetically incompatible. Genetic counselling could serve an advisory role,
however, especially for individuals or groups particularly at risk, permitting
them to reconsider a decision to marry or to have children, or perhaps to take
steps to protect a future child by therapy for the genetic disorder. A difficulty
is, however, that those rushing precipitately into marriage, knowing relatively
little about their partner, are least likely to seek or take such advice, even
127 See generally, CIBA Foundation Symposium 17, Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and
Embryo Transfer (Amsterdam, New York, Elsevier, 1973).
128 Because of lack of knowledge of the blood relationship required by s. 150 of
the Criminal Code, supra, note 13.
120 Commercial suppliers might be able to provide a better geographical spread for
donors, reducing this risk.
130 Though less, the risks of their having a child outside marriage, perhaps following
a casual encounter, should also be considered.
131 With the prospect of detecting such genetic disorders as phenylketonuria at a
treatable stage, but with all of the implications of detecting a baby boy with the XYY
chromosome configuration: see P. N. Brown, Guilt by Physiology: The Constitutionality
of Tests to Determine Predispositions to Violent Behaviour (1974), 48 Southern Calif.
L. Rev. 489.
132 It has been observed that, for all the novelty of the discipline, "Genetic coun-
selling ...is simply medical advice on a rather new, rapidly developing, and highly
specialized topic"; See Lord Kilbrandon, The Comparative Law of Genetic Counselling
in B. Hilton et al., ed., Ethical Issues in Human Genetics: Genetic Counselling and the
Use of Genetic Knowledge (New York: Plenum Press, 1973) at 247.
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though simple tests could disclose transmissible venereal disease, epilepsy and
drug addiction. Among responsible partners, moreover, the degree of risk they
feel justified in taking would be agonizing to assess. If the mother contracted
rubella early in pregnancy, the possibility of abortion followed by another
hopefully uneventful pregnancy could be comfortably discussed, but more
enduring parental disorders raise much greater problems. For instance, a
relatively simple blood test would identify a prospective or married husband
and wife who were sickle-cell heterozygotes. The probability of any child
born to them being a sickle-cell-anemia homozygote, doomed to a life of
suffering and an early death, stands at twenty-five percent.1 33 Rather easier
may be the position of Ashkenazi Jews, 34 among whom there is a 1 in 5,000
births risk of Tay-Sachs disease, a form of infantile amaurotic idiocy leading
to death within the first two to four years of life; the frequency rate among
non-Jewish Americans is 1 in 500,000 births. 35 The condition is caused by an
inherited biochemical abnormality which can be detected in the amniotic fluid
of a pregnant woman, as can the symptoms of, for instance, Down's Syndrome
(mongolism).
This fact may now offer a hopeful approach to many problems inade-
quately soluble, and to others not soluble at all, by premarital genetic screen-
ing. A wait-and-see policy may be adopted, relying upon the technique of
amniocentesis, applied selectively at present due to cost but perhaps in time
universally, to discover defects in the fetus once pregnancy occurs. Identifica-
tion of defect in itself is not enough, of course, since the potential advantage
of extracting a sample of amniotic fluid and analysing its fetal chromosomal
and genetic content lies in the ability to act on the results. The clinical option
of aborting the pregnancy depends upon bringing the circumstances within
section 251 of the Criminal Code, but it has been seen above that this pro-
vision makes no concession towards a eugenic indication for abortion, the
mother's physical or more probably mental health having to be invoked for
this purpose, if possible. The alternative to abortion is to treat the fetus in
utero, which expression may inconsistently include removing a fetus from the
uterus by caesarian section, applying treatment, and restoring it inside the
mother to develop to full term birth.
While treatment of this nature is currently going on in Canada,L30
its basis depends upon knowledge derived from fetal research. A limited
though important proportion of this research is undertaken on fetuses resulting
from induced as opposed to spontaneous abortion, but the public movement
hostile to induced abortion is applying pressure to restrict fetal research. It
has made significant headway in the United States in fostering restrictive atti-
tudes and in securing enactments of state legislatures, notably in Massachu-
13 See Pauling, supra, note 124 at 268-69.
134 In recent origin Central and Western European Jews, as opposed to Sephardi
Jews from Southern Europe, North Africa and Asia.
135See D. Tills, Genes and Disease (1973), 5 Eugenics Society (U.K.) Bulletin at
30-31.
1'6 See Krever, supra, note 8.
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settsI s7 and other New England states, 38 and of federal bodies; this appears
in the stringent regulations proposed by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare for supported fetal research 8 9 and the National Research Act of
1974.140 This imposed a four-month moratorium on federal support for re-
search involving fetuses with beating hearts, before or after an induced abor-
tion,' 41 and constituted a National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, to report directly to Con-
gress in 1976 with recommendations for control.14 How far Canadian practice
will be insulated from and affected restrictively or expansively by these
influences has still to be seen, as has the emergence of any derivative or
original indigenous movement able to restrict fetal research. It is clear, how-
ever, that the social price to be paid for restricted research is the mere main-
tenance and possible deterioration of existing medical standards of both ante-
natal and post-natal care of mother and child, and of the ability to treat
defective fetuses to offer them an improved prospect of living a human life
worthwhile to themselves and others.
The problem of conducting eugenic and more important research on
live fetuses intended to be legally aborted is inescapable, since not all research
can be undertaken on animals and the products of spontaneous abortion. Test-
ing the effect upon the fetus of a potentially beneficial drug or vaccine given
to the mother, for instance, 43 tracing passage of the drug or effects of the
vaccine across the placenta and into the fetus, requires the clinical availability
of affected fetuses of different gestational ages, which cannot be secured other
than by use of live fetuses of determined age already scheduled for abortion.
The costs of appropriate methods of doing this research, evaluated by refer-
ence to a variety of criteria, must be set against the costs of not doing it at
all. In itself, non-research represents a certain though not easily quantifiable
loss to individual and communal health in that it removes the hope of advance-
ment, and there is the consideration that shutting off an area of research may
open the door to new diseases of fetuses, children and adults.
The dark side of fetal research and the abuses that furnish substance
to its critical reception become visible, but the cost of not engaging in re-
search consists less visibly in the suffering of those living and to be born, and
the denial of life to those not to be born, that only research may relieve. If
the facilities and personnel to undertake this research are unavailable, society
137 An Act Prohibiting Experimentation on Human Fetuses, Mass. Gen. Laws An-
notated 1974, c. 421. See also, W. J. Curran, Experimentation Becomes a Crime: Fetal
Research in Massachusetts (1975), 292 New Eng. J. of Med. 300.
188 Where many of the continent's leading medical research institutions are located.
280 See 39 Federal Register (1974) 30648.
14 0 See Public Law 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 U.S. Statutes at Large V.87 1973.
141 Id. s. 213.
142 Id. s. 201.
143 Such as the rubella vaccine, recently claimed to have prevented an anticipated
epidemic and up to 30,000 birth defects among children in the United States, with a
saving of $2 billion in health care: "Rubella Vaccine Foiled Epidemic, U.S. Doctor
Says", The Globe and Mail, March 15, 1975 at 35.
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has no choice but to endure the status quo and regard it finite. Where such
facilities exist, however, as they do in Canada,1M the refusal to use them can
be socially justified only in terms of a clearer set of socially approved priorities
than currently exists. Without reciting the dismal litany of presently un-
treatable genetic and other conditions, it may be concluded that, despite the
achievements of medicine and the New Biology, there is still too much we
do not know.
144 Although the amount of funding the government provides always appears inade-
quate, making medical research seem a low priority and compelling agonizing choices in
distribution of available resources: see Clive Coking, "Medical Research in Canada
Suffering from a Dread Disease", The Globe and Mail Weekend Magazine, March 8,
1975 at 3.

